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Copyright and Unfair Competition
RUDOLF CALLMANN*
The artistic or literary qualities of commercial advertising
and similar sales promotion devices, the garb and form of com-
modities, all demand protection of the law against piracy and in-
fringement, and within prescribed limits they have been accorded
the shelter of the copyright law.1 Many such creations, however,
are not susceptible to copyright protection. Perhaps the author
for one reason or another has not met or cannot meet the require-
ments of the Copyright Act and is unable to claim the exclusive
right to "print, reprint, publish, copy and vend the copyright
work. '2 Or, as is often the case, the conduct of the defendant falls
short of being an infringement of copyright, although he has
usurped the talent, ingenuity and labor of the author. In such
situations the claimant may be able to prove a palming-off and
thus invoke some doctrine of equity designed for the protection
of reputation and good will. But if he fails in this, should he be
outside the pale of the law's protection? The thesis of this article
is to consider the above problem and suggest a solution in the
light of the relationship between the law of copyright and the
law of unfair competition.
The much-discussed case of International News Service v.
Associated Press8 serves as a starting point. The facts are too
well-known to require a detailed exposition. The defendant was
charged with piracy of news, which he regularly copied from
plaintiff's newspaper and bulletins and then published in com-
petition with plaintiff. He contended in defense that any property
that may exist in uncopyrighted literary matter such as news is
lost after publication, and sought to confine the problem within
J.U.D., University of Freiburg, Germany (1919), Research Fellow, Har-
vard Law School (1936-37), LL.B., Harvard Law School (1939); Former Mem-
ber of the Cologne Bar; Author: Der Unlautere Wettbewerb (1929, 2 ed.
1932); Das Deutsche Kartellrecht (1934); What is Unfair Competition? (1940)
28 Geo. L.J. 585; Patent License Agreements Between Competitors and the
Monopoly Issue (1940) 28 Geo. L.J. 871.
1. Act to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright with
Amendments thereto of March 4, 1909. 35 Stat. 1075 et seq., 17 U.S.C.A. § 1 et
seq. (1927).
2. Id. at 1075, 17 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1927).
3. 248 U.S. 215, 39 S.Ct. 68, 63 L. Ed. 211 (1918).
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an artificial concept of property in news matter. However, the
Supreme Court refused to so restrict the plaintiff's rights and
rested the case on the broad proposition that the defendant had
engaged in an unfair competitive practice with a rival news-
gathering agency and publisher. 4 In the course of the decision,
Mr. Justice Pitney made two statements which are particularly
noteworthy.
First, he stated that the right to relief from unfair competi-
tion arises from the Court's concern with the facilities and pro-
cesses of publication and with the business of making news
known to the world. The plaintiff's claim to protection is not
dependent on any general right of property nor is it foreclosed
by showing that the benefits of the copyright act are not avail-
able.5
The second statement of particular interest here came in
response to the defendant's contention that he, like any purchaser
of a newspaper had the right to communicate the intelligence
which it contains to anybody and for any purpose, even for the
purpose of selling it for profit to newspapers published for gain
in competition with complainant's members. The court answered:
"The fault in the reasoning lies in applying as a test the right
of the complainant as against the public, instead of consider-
ing the rights of complainant and defendant, competitors in
business, as between themselves. The right of the purchaser
of a single newspaper to spread knowledge of its contents
gratuitously, for any legitimate purpose not unreasonably in-
terfering with complainant's right to 'make merchandise of it,
may be admitted; but to transmit that news for commercial
use, in competition with complainant-which is what defend-
ant has done and seeks to justify-is a very different matter.
In doing this defendant, by its very act, admits that it is taking
material that has been acquired by complainant as the result
of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money
and which is salable by complainant for money, and that de-
fendant, in appropriating it and selling it as its own, is en-
deavoring to reap where it has not sown, and by disposing of
it to newspapers that are competitors of complainant's mem-
bers is appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have
sown. Stripped of all disguises, the process amounts to an un-
4. 248 U.S. 215, 234, 39 S.Ct. 68, 71, 63 L.Ed. 211, 219 (1918).
5. 248 U.S. 215, 235, 39 S.Ct. 68, 71, 63 L.Ed. 211, 219 (1918).
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authorized interference with the normal operation of com-
plainant's legitimate business precisely at the point where the
profit is to be reaped, in order to divert a material portion of
the profit from those who have earned it to those who have
not, with special advantage to defendant in the competition
because of the fact that it is not burdened with any part of
the expense of gathering the news. The transaction speaks for
itself, and a court of equity ought not to hesitate long in char-
acterizing it as unfair competition in business. ' 6 (Italics sup-
plied.)
These, and other statements of similar import point unmistakably
to the fact that in the Associated Press case the business of gather-
ing and communicating information was granted the protection
of the law on the ground of preserving ethical standards of com-
petition, and this regardless of whether or not the news matter,
which is the tangible evidence of complainant's labor, was the
proper subject of statutory copyright.
It is apparent that the implications of the Associated Press
case are manifold. The statements of the Supreme Court are
sufficiently inclusive to embrace a large group of interests which
otherwise are only imperfectly recognized. However, the doctrine
has been cautiously received and subjected to skeptical comment
from sources which cannot be lightly ignored. How true, for
example, is the following statement of Judge Learned Hand?
"... we think that no more was covered than situations sub-
stantially similar to those then at bar [printed news dis-
patches]. The difficulties of understanding it otherwise are
insuperable. We are to suppose that the court meant to create
a sort of common-law patent or copyright for reasons of jus-
tice. Either would flagrantly conflict with the scheme which
Congress has for more than a century devised to cover the
subject matter."7
Newsmatter is only one of many types of information which
are currently derived from some commonly accessible source
through the expenditure of money and effort. Reference materials
are regularly organized and presented for use in such compila-
tions as directories, maps, guidebooks, consumer and personnel
lists, and encyclopedias. The information contained in these and
many other similar publications is ferreted out and made avail-
6. 248 U.S. 215, 239, 39 S.Ct. 68, 72, 63 L.Ed. 211, 221 (1918).
7. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.(2d) 279, 280 (C.C.A. 2d, 1929).
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able through the efforts of statisticians and experts. Is it less pro-
tected because it is gathered together and expressed in some form
other than that of a newspaper or radio broadcast?
I. IMITATION OF INTANGIBLE GOODS
In discussing the protection available to authors or compilers
of information designed for commercial use, courts demonstrate
a marked tendency to inject considerations of statutory copyright
which are wholly inappropriate to the problem. The origin of this
treatment probably can be attributed to precedents furnished by
the English courts. Several cases decided during the middle of
the last century showed a marked inclination to protect money
and labor expended in the compilation of fact material against
unethical competition. At that time, however, the elaborate net-
work of rules and concepts expressly regulating competitive
practices were unknown, and any idea which the courts enter-
tained of protecting the plaintiff's interest in this respect must of
necessity have found expression in such protective rules and de-
vices as were then available. It is not surprising, therefore, that
mechanical, though laboriously made, collections were held to
be proper subject matter of copyright although they completely
lacked the element of authorship." Interests which now are or
should be protected through doctrines of competition were made
the determinative factor of copyrightability. The early cases show
little regard for the particular character of the work under con-
sideration, and decisions relating to historical and literary works
quote indiscriminately from cases dealing with directories and
annotated editions.10
8. In the American case, Colliery Engineer Co. v. Ewald, 126 Fed. 843
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1903) Justice Lacombe says: "It would seem that all books
which are not purely literary-that is, are not works of creative or imaginative
literature, but merely compilations of statements found elsewhere-should
be treated alike in applying the principles of the law of copyright. Legal di-
gests, such educational books as we have here, algebras, arithmetics, etc., sta-
tistical yearbooks, directories, gazetteers, business or social registers, are all
produced by the same methods, and the use of a skill that is merely clerical.
I do not understand that this proposition is a novel one, and should have so
held had there been no opinion delivered in Edward Thompson Co. v. Ameri-
can Law Books Co., 121 Fed. 907."
9. But see Weil, American Copyright Law (1917) 1143 et seq., in which
the author emphasizes the mere utilitarian character of some of these works
dealt with under the heading of "fair use" and infringement of copyright.
10. Thus the cases Morris v. Wright, L.R. 5 Ch. App. 279 (1870) and Pike
v. Nicholas, L.R. 5 Ch. App. 251 (1869), dealing with historical and literary
works quote the directory cases, Kelly v. Morris, L.R. 1 Eq. 697 (1866) and
Morris v. Ashbee, L. R. 7 Eq. 34 (1868). The American directory cases, Col-
liery Engineer Co. v. Ewald, 126 Fed. 843 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1903) and Hartford
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Perhaps the most instructive of the old cases is Kelly v.
Morris." Here the defendant compiled a directory or guide book
utilizing information which could have been derived from sources
common to all, but which he obtained from the book of the plain-
tiff. The court granted an injunction because the defendant should
have obtained and worked out the information independently for
himself. The only legitimate use which he was permitted to make
of previous works was for the purpose of verifying the correct-
ness of his own findings. The court laid down the following well-
known principles:
"The Defendant has been most completely mistaken in what
he assumes to be his right to deal with the labour and prop-
erty of others. In the case of a dictionary, map, guide-book,
or directory, when there are certain common objects of infor-
mation which must, if described correctly, be described in the
same words, a subsequent compiler is bound to set about doing
for himself that which the first compiler has done. In case
of a road-book, he must count the milestones for himself. In
the case of a map of a newly-discovered island . . .he must
go through the whole process of triangulation just as if he
had never seen any former map, and, generally, he is not en-
titled to take one word of the information previously published
without independently working out the matter for himself, so
as to arrive at the same result from the same common sources
of information, and the only use that he can legitimately make
of a previous publication is to verify his own calculations and
results when obtained. 12
The Court in Morris v. Ashbee,18 also a case of a trade directory,
referring to Kelly v. Morris, stated the rule as follows:
"... no one has a right to take the results of the labour and
expense incurred by another for the purposes of a rival pub-
lication, and thereby save himself the expense and labour of
working out and arriving at these results by some independent
road.""4
Printing Co. v. Hartford Directory and Publishing Co., 146 Fed. 332 (C.C.D
Conn. 1906) quote the case, Moffatt & Paige, Ltd. v. George Gill & Sons, Ltd.,
86 L.T. (N.S.) 465 (1902) dealing with an annotated edition of Shakespeare's
"As You Like It."
11. L.R. 1 Eq. 697 (1866).
12. Id. at 701.
13. L.R. 7 Eq. 34 (1868).
14. Id. at 40.
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The Court in Hogg v. Scott,15 also referring to Kelly v. Morris
and upon similar facts, said:
"The true principle in all these cases is, that the Defendant
is not at liberty to use or avail himself of the labour which
the plaintiff has been at for the purpose of producing his work
-that is, in fact, merely to take away the result of another
man's labour, or, in other words, his property."' 6
Vice-Chancellor Sir G. M. Giffard, who delivered the opinion
in Morris v. Ashbee, rendered a concurring opinion in the later
case of Pike v. Nicholas.17 Although the problem then before the
court was the alleged piracy of material contained in a historical
treatise, Giffard used the occasion to impose limitations on the
principle of Kelly v. Morris without expressly referring to the
latter case. He stated that the correct principle would not prevent
defendant from looking into plaintiff's book for direction to the
sources of information he desires.
This rule is probably satisfactory in scientific and historical
works, in the preparation of which it is important to discover
whether one authority has made fair use of the quotations of a
predecessor; but it has been called a very harsh rule when applied
to the mechanical works we are considering. 8 In a later case,
Moffatt and Paige v. Gill,'9 the court said:
"You cannot where another man has compiled a directory,
simply take his sheets, and reprint them as your own, but you
are entitled, taking the sheets with you, to go and see whether
the existing facts concur with the description in the sheets,
and if you do that you may publish the result as your own."
The inequity of the rule was pointed out in the American case,
Collier Engineer Co. v. Ewald.2° The-court presented the forceful
illustration of B who, in preparing a directory of architects,
simply purloined appropriate items from A's business directory
and was thus enabled to place on the market a profitable com-
pilation at a merely trifling expenditure of time and trouble, be-
cause A had already done the work which B thus appropriated.
But it must be admitted that this practice, however doubtful it
may be from the standpoint of good business morality, has been
15. L.R. 18 Eq. 444 (1874).
16. Id. at 458.
17. L.R. 5 Ch. App. 251, 267 (1868).
18. See Colliery Engineer Co. v. Ewald, 126 Fed. 843 (C.C.S.D. N.Y 1903).
19. 86 L.T. (N.S.) 465 (1902).
20. 126 Fed. 843, 844 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1903).
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sanctioned in all the other American cases, which have been con-
tent to follow the English rule.2
Although the attitude of the courts toward competitive prac-
tices has been important in influencing the determination as to
whether or not a particular compilation is properly subject to
copyright, yet the courts have succeeded in avoiding direct refer-
ence to the problem of unfair competition, and have directed their
attention solely to the fact that the compilation is protected by
a valid copyright. Considerations of competition alone should
afford protection in proper cases even when copyright is not avail-
able.
There arises another question. Many authors do not apply
for a copyright, although copyright protection is available. Should
this be a bar to relief on the theory of unfair competition? Or is
something to be permitted under the law of unfair competition
merely because it is permitted under the copyright law? Shall
the success of the plaintiff's suit depend upon whether or not he
met the requirements of the copyright statute in a case where
he complains of the defendant's appropriation of the fruits of his
effort and expenditure?
Let us consider a few cases: A rival has appropriated the
plaintiff's edition of Shakespeare's plays, not in order to spread
the author's work to the mass of interested people, but in order
to enable himself, the rival, to compete successfully with the
plaintiff; a plaintiff's colleague liberally helps himself to the
former's lectures, not to furnish eager youth with the wisdom of
his brother in science, but to spare his own time and effort and
to take advantage of another;22 one person lifts material from the
other's draft of application and contract forms.2 3 In all the above
situations the courts appear satisfied to determine the rights of
the plaintiff through a simple inquiry into the existence of a copy-
right or common law literary property. If the copyright or prop-
erty can be found, the plaintiff will be protected; if the copyright
was not secured, or the claim to literary property was lost through
publication, he is without further remedy.
21. See Bullinger v. Mackey, 4 Fed. Cas. No. 2,127 (C.C.E.D. N.Y. 1879);
Edward Thompson Co. v. American Law Book Co., 122 Fed. 922, 62 L.R.A.
607 (C.C.A. 2d, 1903); Social Register Ass'n v. Murphy, 128 Fed. 116 (C.C.R.I.
1904); Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 Fed. 539 (C.C.A.
1st, 1905).
22. Nutt v. National Institute Inc. for the Improvement of Memory, 31
F. (2d) 236 (C.C.A. 2d, 1929).
23. Brightley v. Littleton, 37 Fed. 103 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1888).
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In Bamforth v. Douglass Post Card and Machine Co. 24 the
plaintiff manufactured post cards impressed with pictures photo-
graphed from living models. The defendant made exact copies of
the plaintiff's photographs and sold them upon post cards at a
much lower price than the plaintiff could possibly afford. How-
ever, when application for an injunction was made, the court re-
fused relief because, in the absence of copyright protection
"neither a book nor a photograph can continue to be the author's
exclusive property, after it has been printed and offered to the
public for sale."25 Again, in another case26 the plaintiff issued
a pamphlet on which appeared advertisements of the various
merchants comprising an association, and proposed an ingenious
system for giving coupons with every cash purchase. The defend-
ant issued a similar pamphlet in which he appropriated the plain-
tiff's scheme. Here the question of whether or not relief was
available was made by the court to depend on the fact that the
plaintiff had procured a copyright. This inquiry was again made
the determinative factor where one defendant copied chromo-
lithographs of vegetable products, 27 and still again where a de-
fendant imitated a plaintiff's colored photographs of natural
scenes.
28
The situations and cases to which we have referred all relate
to unfair practices by competitors, and the decisive point in each
instance should be that the defendant did not independently work
out his compilation, artistic reproduction, or advertising scheme.
The competitive relationship was obvious and the sole aim of the
defendants was to emerge victorious in the struggle of competi-
tion. The common element is the appropriation of a 'competitor's
work, which is adapted to suit the defendant's need and then
turned against its author in the economic struggle. Yet in all these
cases we seek in vain for a word about unfair competition. The
courts took only the law of copyright into their consideration.
The copyright act serves a genuine need by protecting artistic
and literary works against definite types of infringement. But it
does not follow that it embraces within the zone of its protection
every right and interest which can arise in connection with writ-
ten or printed matter.
24. 158 Fed. 355 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1908).
25. Id. at 857.
26. Mutual Advertising Co. v. Refo, 76 Fed. 961 (C.C.S.C. 1896). This case
marks the boundary of the availability of a copyright.
27. Stecher Lithographic Co. v. Dunston Lithograph Co., 233 Fed. 601
(D.C.W.D. N.Y. 1916).
28. Cleland v. Thayer, 121 Fed. 71 (C.C.A. 8th, 1903).
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At this point we may profitably examine the scope of the
copyright act with a view toward determining its proper function.
The different exclusive rights of the proprietor of copyright may
be grouped under three headings:
(1) The right of copying and dissemination of copies.
(2) The right of modification or transformation.
(3) The right of performance or representation.
Are all or any of these rights the true bases for the protection
invoked in the cases already considered? It can hardly be con-
tended that the conduct of the defendants in those situations
amounting to a copying of the original work. They made no simple
reproduction for the purpose of allowing the community to enjoy
the original under more favorable conditions. The protection
granted by the act against modification and transformation is the
only safeguard which relates to the issuance of a copy not iden-
tical with the original. The prohibition here is against translation
into other languages, dramatization and adaptation to other
means of expression. Even in these cases the original work must
be popularized.
To understand the significance of these rights for the cases
we have put, we must consider the different relationships which
obtain in copyright and in unfair competition cases. In the
copyright situation the typical relationships are: creator-inter-
mediary-public. Who the intermediary is depends upon the
nature of the work. Where works of art are concerned he may
be the promoter of an exhibition, or the vendor, or the copyist.
With respect to musical works he is the performer or publisher
of the music. In the case of literary works he is the performer,
publisher, translator, or dramatizer (according to the purposes of
the publication). All these intermediaries serve functions similar
to those of the middleman in the process of distributing goods.
Consequently, there is no room for any competitive relationship
unless the competitor is a rival of one of the intermediaries, that
is, a rival in the effort to communicate the work to the public. It
is this competitive relationship which is the index of any unfair
competition situation. Hence, the rival of the author who wants
to utilize the work of another only to assist himself in producing
his own, stands outside the sphere of the copyright relationships
and moves exclusively in the sphere of competition.
No one is harmed if the rival is entirely excluded from any
right to the form of the work of his competitor even after the
[Vol. II
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copyright has expired; since he does not need it for any lawful
purpose. It is the form and not the idea of a work that the law
of copyright protects. It is designed "to promote the progress of
science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors
S.. the exclusive right to their ... writings. ' 29 These exclusive
rights are the compensation paid by the legislature for the au-
thor's surrender of his works to the public. Quite different is the
situation with regard to patents on technical inventions. First,
it is the idea which is protected by the patent law. Second, it is
intended that after its expiration the patent should be ceded to
competitive manufacturers. They, however, are only the inci-
dental beneficiaries-the intermediaries between the original
owner of the patent and the public. This distinction between
patent and copyright finds its support in the diversity of expres-
sion in the two statutes: The patent right is granted to exclude
others from making, using, and vending the work. Using is sub-
divided into the three kinds of use mentioned above; a making
does not come into question! 0
II. "CHARACTER" IMITATION
The above considerations should also dispose of the cases in
which a character created by one author is used by another.
Neither copyright nor trademark law is appropriate. It may hap-
pen that the effect of an appropriation of a character is also a
palming-off, but the appropriation itself should be sufficient to
give rise to a cause of action. The following examples are from
cases in which the decisions fail to observe the foregoing analysis.
In Munro v. Touseys1 the plaintiff was the publisher of a
series of detective stories for which he had adopted the title "The
Old Sleuth Library." "Old Sleuth the Detective" was the name
given to the author. The court allowed the defendant publishing
a similar series of stories "The New York Detective Library" to
use titles containing words "Young Sleuth" and "Sleuth." It held
that in the absence of proof of a palming-off, the plaintiff had no
property right in the word "Sleuth" which would justify the in-
terference of the court. The same reasoning may be found in
another case,82 in which the title "Charley's Aunt" given to the
29. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, c. 8.
30. See also Powell, The Nature of a Patent Right (1917) 17 Col. L. Rev.
663, 665.
31. 129 N.Y. 38, 29 N.E. 9 (1891).
32. Frohman v. Miller, 29 N.Y. Supp. 1109, 8 Misc. 379 (1894).
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plaintiff's play was held not infringed by the title "Charley's
Uncle" given to the defendant's play. In the "Buster Brown"
case3 the court held that an artist has no such common law copy-
right in the characters of his pictures as will entitle him to main-
tain a claim of unfair competition if his publisher should imitate
the Buster Brown characters in pictures drawn by another 'artist.
However, it is difficult to deny that the publisher in so doing has
assisted the second artist in an unfair competitive practice.
A more straightforward approach to the problem presented
by character imitation was adopted in Fisher v. Star Co. 4 Here
the plaintiff, creator of a comic strip which is well-known under
the title "Mutt and Jeff," had drawn his cartoons for the defend-
ant and others. He sued the defendant for advertising comic pic-
tures drawn by the latter's employees in imitation of those of the
plaintiff. This was done after the contract between plaintiff and
defendant had expired. From the facts given it is apparent that
here was material susceptible of copyright protection, yet the
court based the plaintiff's right to injunctive relief on neither the
law of copyright nor of trademark protection. It proceeded wholly
on the principle that Fisher's well-known characters had acquired
a secondary meaning in the world of comic strips. It is submitted
that the court adopted the proper approach to the problem. The
dissenting opinion of Crane, J.,35 who contended that the plaintiff
sought to assert a right that could be maintained only under the
law of copyright, entirely ignored the competitive feature of the
case.
If the artist is a photographer and has made a reproduction
from a scene or a living model, the interests that demand pro-
tection are the same as those considered under the comic strip
situations. In Gross v. Seligman3 ' a photographer made a picture
of a model in the nude. He entitled the photograph "The Grace
of Youth" and procured a copyright which he sold to the plaintiff.
Thereafter he again procured the same model to assume an iden-
tical pose, except that this time she obligingly bedecked herself
with a smile and held a cherry in her mouth. This latter work
of art was appropriately entitled "Cherry Ripe." It is clear that
the real cause of action against the defendant was for the palm-
ing-off and for defendant's interference with the contractual rela-
83. Outcalt v. New York Herald, 146 Fed. 205 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1906).
34. 231 N.Y. 414, 132 N.E. 133 (1921).
35. 231 N.Y. 414, 435, 132 N.E. 133, 140 (1921).
36. 212 Fed. 930 (C.C.A. 2d, 1914).
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tion between the plaintiff and his artist. The court, however,
granted relief on the ground that the defendant had infringed
the copyright of the plaintiff.
These competition cases never present pure copyright situa-
tions. The competitor does not use the work of another in the
manner condemned by the copyright law. He wants to have the
work of his rival superseded by his own, rather than to have the
original disseminated to the public.
III. A PURE COPYRIGHT CASE
Courts not only have invoked the law of copyright to dispose
of cases which should have been determined by principles of un-
fair competition, but have sometimes resorted to the converse
practice, and relied on rules of competition in situations which
were properly within the exclusive sphere of copyright. A good
illustration is found in the recent Pennsylvania case, Waring v.
WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc.27 The facts were as follows:
The publishers and copyright owners of two songs licensed the
Victor Talking Machine Company to use these on records, but not
for public performance for profit. The company employed Fred
Waring, the conductor of a nationally known orchestra to record
the songs. The records, labelled "not licensed for radio broadcast"
were then sold to the public. The defendant, proprietor of a radio
station, purchased one of the records and obtained a license to
broadcast the songs from the American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers (assignee of the exclusive right of public
performance under the copyright). It then broadcast the records
as a part of its program and made the customary announcement
that the music heard was a mechanical reproduction. Waring, the
conductor, filed a bill to enjoin the defendant from broadcasting
the records. Mr. Justice Stern disposed of the case by raising
three major questions: (1) Have the performers any enforceable
property rights in their artistic interpretation of the work of a
composer? (2) If so, to what extent can such rights be reserved
at the time of what the law designates as publication? (3) Under
what circumstances can performers be afforded equitable relief
ancillary to such rights on the ground of unfair competition? The
court correctly answered the first question in the affirmative and
also asserted that the restriction placed upon the use of the
records was to be enforced in equity. However, the court held
37. 327 Pa. 433, 194 At. 631 (1937).
1940]
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that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction on the ground of
unfair competition. It relied on the Associated Press case and
Fonotipia Ltd. v. Bradley. 8 The propriety of applying principles
of competition to the facts above given is open to serious question.
It may be readily admitted that in one sense of the word
Waring and the defendant were competitors. The court pointed
out that they both furnish entertainment to the public over the
radio. Also, as the opinion stated, "the defendant can in effect
'sell' to its advertising customers and to the public at practically
no expense to itself, the identical musical renditions of plaintiff's
orchestra,"3 9 and finally, it is doubtless true "that such competi-
tion is extremely harmful to plaintiff and his orchestra. . . . It
probably must become increasingly difficult for them to demand
and obtain $13,500 for a single performance over the radio if
innumerable reiteration of their renditions can be furnished at a
cost of seventy-five cents."40 But all this is not sufficient to inform
us as to the nature of the competitive relationship and the nature
of the unfair competition. Using the terms of our statement
above,"' we may designate the parties as rivals in the effort to
communicate the work of an author to the public. The broad-
casting of the defendant would have been lawful if there had not
been a copyright. But it is here that the Waring case must be
distinguished from both the Associated Press and the Fonotipia
cases. In neither of these latter cases was the protection of copy-
rightable material in issue. In the Associated Press case the
object of protection was the organization with which the Asso-
ciated Press gathered news, rather than the contents of particular
news dispatches; in the Fonotipia case it was the commercial and
technical efforts of the plaintiff in producing records, and not the
subject-matter of the record. But in the Waring case, if there had
not been a copyright, the consequent enrichment of the defend-
ant, as well as the benefit to the public by the cheapness of the
38. 171 Fed. 951 (C.C.E.D. N.Y. 1909). In this case the plaintiff produced and
put on the market music records for use upon machines, and the defendant
copied records directly from the original discs of the plaintiff. Chatfield, D.J.,
granted relief and stated: "Where a product is placed upon the market
under advertisement and statement that the substitute or imitating product is
a duplicate of the original, and where the commercial value of the imitation
lies in the fact that it takes advantage of and appropriates to itself the com-
mercial qualities, reputation, and salable properties of the original, equity
should grant relief." Id. at 964.
39. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 454, 194
AtI. 631, 641 (1937).
40. Ibid.
41. Supra, p. 656.
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price, would have been a contemplated result of the copyright
law. 42
The relationship between plaintiff and defendant in the
Waring case should be differently analyzed. As a rule, the or-
chestra conductor (like the radio station) is an intermediary
through whom the composer of songs reaches the public. In this
sense they are rivals. But if the conductor is claiming an exclu-
sive right in his orchestral performance, he then should be con-
sidered in the position of a composer, and the radio station be-
comes the intermediary between him and the public.48 To this
extent there is no competitive relationship between them.44 "It is
not sufficient to determine the relationship between parties
simply by broad reference to their callings or professions. We
must consider the relationship of their particular activities in the
concrete case.4 5 It follows that when the court based its decision
42. See supra, p. 657. In Waring v. WVDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc.,
327 Pa. 433, 455, n. 13, 194 Atl. 631, 641 (1937) It is said: "It was testified that
between 350 and 450 broadcasting stations in the United States use records
almost exclusively instead of 'live talent', both for their commercial and
their sustaining programs."
43. Mr. Justice Maxey rendered an opinion In which he concurred in the
conclusion but dissented from the rationale of the majority. He points out
that any interpreter of a musical or other type of composition has an In-
terest in his interpretation to which a law accords the status of a right and
which it will protect. This statement Is to be preferred to that of the ma-
jority opinion which confined protection to an interpretation constituting a
product of "novel and artistic creations" which "elevates Interpretations to
the realm of independent works of art."
44. Quite different from the facts in the Waring case are those of the
case of RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 28 F. Supp. 787 (D.C.S.D. N.Y. 1939).
Here there was a competitive relationship between the Intermediaries, Radio
Corporation of America, Radio Station WBO, and any other firm engaged in
the business of manufacturing, producing, recording, selling, and distributing
records. There was no competitive relationship between Whiteman and
WBO. There was originally no competitive relationship between RCA and
Whiteman, but the latter became an accomplice of RCA's competitors in
licensing to them records for broadcasting and public performances together
with representations to the effect that he alone was entitled to grant such
licenses. The support of another's unfair competition is also unfair competi-
tion. Hence the opinion of Judge Leibell in the Whiteman case was correct
in referring to the Associated Press case (id. at 793) and we may salute this
opinion as one which gives further support to that extremely important case.
However, the case is open to question insofar as it also assumes unfair
competition by WBO against Whiteman (Id. at 794).
45. The profession of the musician Is a good example of the variety of
activities In which the relationships change when observed from different
points of view. For instance, note the position of the musician in the follow-
ing instances: Stokovski conducts a Beethoven symphony (conductor as In-
termediary); he arranges a Bach Toccata composed for a harpischord or
organ Into a composition for a modern orchestra (composer and intermedi-
ary); Liszt paraphrased Mozart's Don Juan (composer and intermediary) and
so forth.
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upon the ground of unfair competition it failed to do justice to
these particular facts.4 6
IV. IMITATION OF ADVERTISEMENTS
In examining those cases in which the copyright idea has
been applied to advertising devices, the reader should bear in
mind the suggestions already made relative to the position of
competitors in the sphere of copyright .4  They are superfluous as
intermediaries between the author and the public, so that no
public interest justifies their using a non-copyrighted work. More-
over, literary or artistic works employed in other people's busi-
ness activities are not indispensable to the conduct of a competing
business. There is still another consideration. When, as in the
directory cases, the competitor uses the work of another for his
own advertising purposes, he is not interested in the literary
or artistic value of the work but merely in its effectiveness as
advertising. Consequently, the only proper question in advertis-
ing cases, where there is no danger of confusion, is: Has one
saved his own labor and money by appropriating the advertis-
ing matter of a competitor who on his part had to make expendi-
tures of effort and capital?
Limitations of space preclude any detailed treatment of the
law of copyright in its relationship to advertising. However, d
few cases that illustrate the advantages of the doctrines of unfair
competition over the accepted copyright approach may be con-
sidered. In Yuengling, Jr. v. Schile,4 8 the plaintiff, a brewer,
sought to protect a chromolithograph entitled "King Gambrinus
and his followers" which showed the jovial monarch and his reti-
nue enjoying lager beer (probably of the plaintiff's manufac-
ture). The defendant, a rival brewer, simulated this picture by
a chromo, suggesting possibly that Gambrinus preferred the de-
fendant's Bock to the plaintiff's Lager, despite the fact that legend
has attributed the origin of lager beer to that ancient Flemish
king. Hilson Co. v. Foster49 was a case in which the defendant
had copied from the plaintiff, rival, a banquet scene in a hotel
dining room as an advertisement for cigars. In both of these
cases it is obvious that the concept of unfair competition is more
46. See also Shelton, The Protection of the Interpretative Rights of a
Musical Artist, etc. (1939) I Copyright Law Symposium. Contra: Littauer,
The Present Legal Status of Artists, Recorders and Broadcasters in America
(1938) III Geistiges Elgentum 217, 222.
47. See supra, p. 656.
48. 12 Fed. 97 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1882).
49. 80 Fed. 896 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1897).
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appropriate for protection of the plaintiff's interests than was the
copyright idea invoked by the court. The same may be said of
Schumacher v. Schwencke, Jr.5 0 Here the subject matter was a
painting from a wood-cut, used as an advertising label for cigar
boxes. Although the issue decided was copyright infringement,
the language of the court is more convincing as support for a
claim of unfair competition:
"The complainant has a painting which is concededly valu-
able. Time, money, and artistic skill were expended in its
production. The defendants openly and boldly pirated it, and
are now reaping the rewards that fairly belong to the com-
plainant. They have the whole material universe from which
to choose. They can make any design of their own and be
protected in its use; but the law will not permit them to ap-
propriate the result of others ingenuity and skill, and profit
by the wrong thus committed."". (Italics supplied.)
The case of Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. 52 marks
a step forward by recognizing a copyright in advertising material.
However, the circus posters, which were the protected subjects
of that decision, with their elaborate arrangements of ballet
dancers and trick cyclists should not require the intervention of
of copyright in order to be secured against competitive imitation.
The protection of copyright to advertising has been extended
to an elaborate variety of printed matters. An example of the
liberality of the courts is furnished by Ansehl v. Puritan Pharma-
ceutical Co 53 A newspaper advertisement, composed of a photo-
graph and an array of advertising and descriptive matter which
was ingeniously arranged on the page so as to attract attention
was protected in all its features by copyright. The opinion con-
tains the following statement:
"The defendants might appropriate the [plaintiff's] ideas
and express them in their own pictures and in their own lan-
guage, but they could not appropriate the plaintiff's advertise-
ment by copying his arrangement of material, his illustrations
and language . . . without subjecting themselves to liability
for infringement. '54
50. 25 Fed. 466 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1885).
51. Id. at 468.
52. 188 U.S. 239, 23 S.Ct. 298, 47 L.Ed. 460 (1903).
53. 61 F. (2d) 131 (C.C.A. 8th, 1932), cert. denied 287 U.S. 666, 53 S.Ct.
224, 77 L.Ed. 574 (1932).
54. Id. at 138. In Fargo Mercantile Co. v. Brechet & Richter Co., 295 Fed.
823 (C.C.A. 8th, 1924), a clear case of unfair competition, the Circuit Court of
1940]
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Still stronger cases of an erroneous application of copyright
principles are presented by the cases dealing with the imitation
of catalogues. Starting with the English decisions, we find them
similar to the directory cases,55 and it is interesting to note that
the courts, whether they recognize the copyright on an advertis-
ing catalogue or not, reflect a strong feeling of the unfairness of
competition by copying. Where the copyright is affirmed, it is
the "fair use" doctrine of the copyright law which the courts em-
ploy; and where they feel unable to help the plaintiff because the
catalogue is not copyrighted or copyrightable, they often find
other ways of expressing their disapproval. If we compare the
two leading cases, Hotten v. Arthur-and Cobbett v. Woodward,57
we can easily perceive this. In Hotten v. Arthur the plaintiff, a
bookseller of old and curious books, published catalogues which
were not mere lists of the books and their prices, but contained
in many instances short accounts of the history of the books or
notices of their contents and anecdotes respecting them. The de-
fendant copied much verbatim from plaintiff's catalogues. Here,
as in the directory cases, the only fair use recognized was the
production of an original work, and no mere copying, no merely
colorable alterations, no blind repetition of obvious errors is per-
missible. More interesting, however, is the following passage in
the opinion of Vice-Chancellor Sir W. Page Wood which states
the essence of the present problem:
"Suppose the case of a professional writer (there may well be
such), whose peculiardepartment it is to make out 'Catalogues
Raisonn~es' of this kind, and to write such abstracts of the
noticeable points in the various books of the catalogue as we
have here. A man who is an author for this purpose would
naturally expect that the very fact that he had printed such
notes for one publisher would lead to his employment for a
similar purpose by another. Suppose now this other say to
him, 'I have no occasion for your services, "paste and scissors
work" will give me all I want,' could it be denied that he would
have a right to come here to prevent this unremunerated use
of his labor." 8
Appeals granted a decree for copyright infringement, while the court below
had denied any relief from the alleged unfair competition, but had awarded
an injunction and damages for infringement of the copyright.
55. See supra, p. 652 et seq.
56. 1 Hem. & M. 603 (Ch. 1863).
57. L.R. 14 Eq. 407 (1872).
58. Hotten v. Arthur, 1 Hem. & M. 603, 607 (Ch. 1863).
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In Cobbett v. Woodward the court held that an advertising
drawing is not subject to copyright. However, costs were refused
the defendant. The language of the opinion at this point is in-
structive.
"At the same time, I am bound to say that where it is shown
that the second advertiser has been making use literally of the
drawings of the first advertiser, ana copying them precisely,
I think that the court, though it could not stop him from tak-
ing that course, must feel that a use has been made of the
works of the first advertiser which would not be considered
fair amongst gentlemen, nor (for the rules are the same as
regards the usual intercourse of life) amongst fair traders, and
would not give costs to the man who deliberately endeavored
to profit by the exertions of his fellow tradesman."59
Thus the court condemns the defendant for exercising the
very right which it expressly recognized as being his. If the lat-
ter's conduct was lawful, it is strange that he should be punished
because of it. The path to be pursued is clear. The defendant
engaged in unfair competition and the plaintiff is entitled to a
remedy without reference to the copyright law.
Cobbett v. Woodward was overruled in two later cases, which
followed Hotten v. Arthur. Grace v. Newman, ° the first of these
cases, dealt with a catalogue containing monumental designs; the
other decision, Maple & Co. v. Junior Army & Navy Stores, 61 was
concerned with a furniture catalogue. In both instances the cata-
logues were registered under the Copyright Act. In the Maple
Company case the court said:
"I consider it is substantially made out that, to a very large
extent, the Defendants have copied from the books, and
availed themselves of the labours and expenditure of the
plaintiffs. That being so, it certainly does not incline one to
do otherwise than put the case in a state in which, according
to honesty and the rectitude of proceedings on the part of the
public, it ought to be put."6 2
In the Court of Appeals Lord Justice Lindley added:
"The defendants have made a use of the plaintiffs' work which,
as observed by Lord Romilly in Cobbett v. Woodward, would
59. L.R. 14 Eq. 407 (1872).
60. L.R. 19 Eq. 623 (1875).
61. L.R. 21 Ch. D. 369 (1882).
62. Id. at 372.
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not be considered fair among fair traders, and we ought not
to strain the Act to make such a proceeding legal. 6
8
Finally, in Collis v. Cater, Stoffel & Forth, Ltd.64 the plaintiff,
a chemist and druggist, issued a catalogue of articles, medicines,
and drugs containing under different headings some alphabetical
lists of articles with their prices; the defendants inserted in their
catalogue copies of the lists from the plaintiff's catalogue. The
court held that the lists were subjects of copyright and disclosed
the deeper reason for the decision in the following statement:
"What has been done in this case is to leave the neighbour
who was the first to prepare a catalogue to bear all the ex-
pense and trouble of doing it, and to set to work without
trouble or expense to take a copy of that catalogue and have
one printed from it. The man who acts thus is simply using
his neighbour's expense and labour for his own advantage. He
is what is called pirating his neighbour's book. The question
is whether that is a thing he has a right to do so. It does not
apply to sellers of drugs only, it applies to any other persons
carrying on trade under such circumstances that a catalogue
of the goods they deal in is desirable. I see no difference be-
tween this trade and any other trade. The question is whether
a man has a right to appropriate to himself without payment
or recognition in any way what it has cost his neighbour ex-
pense and trouble to make out. In my opinion he has not.
65
We have discussed these English cases somewhat broadly be-
cause they reveal, in their opinions, better than the American
cases, the competitive considerations which so often appear under
the guise of copyright law. The unfair use, which is evident in
these cases, cannot be prevented under the copyright law if the
catalogue is not of artistic originality but contains "pictures re-
produced by photographic or other mechanical processes, "66 un-
less, indeed, we wish to create a copyright regardless of any value
and artistic merit of the works subject to it. Where the unfair-
ness of the use consists in the appropriation of another's labor
and money, the outcome of litigation should not depend upon
whether or not the form of the catalogue is sufficiently ingenious
63. Id. at 381.
64. 78 L.T. (N.S.) 613 (1898).
65. See also W. Marshall & Co., Ltd. v. A.H. Bull, Ltd., 85 L.T. (N.S.) 77
(1901); Davis v. Benjamin [1906] 2 Ch. 491.




to meet the demands of copyright law. The trend the courts have
been following leads to an unlimited expansion of the definitions
of literature and art in the copyright statutes. The upshot is
that the Copyright Act has come to be misused as the asylum of
the injured competitor against the piracy of his rival. This is
clearly a perversion of the copyright idea.
The temptation to treat a catalogue as a subject of copyright
increases in proportion with its artistic character. For example,
in Da Prato Statuary Co. v. Giuliani Statuary Co." the parties
were producer and seller of statuary and other articles for the
decoration of churches and religious edifices. The plaintiff, at
great expense and labor, prepared and issued a trade catalogue
containing pictures and cuts of various statuary and other articles
which could be produced only by skilled photographers. The
court expressly denied, without giving an explanation, the plain-
tiff's motion for a temporary injunction against the copying de-
fendant "so far as it is based upon the claim of unfair competi-
tion" but granted it on the basis of copyright. Many other cases
in which copyright was successfully invoked dealt with drawings
that were designed and prepared by "persons of skill and artistic
capacity,"6 8 whose services, the court expressly obsefved, usually
cost the plaintiff considerable amounts of money.
The sense of justice of the uninitiated is shocked on the dis-
covery that a commercial rival who engages in predatory prac-
tices and boldly usurps the labor and skill of his competitor is
unmolested by the law simply because his victim has failed to
grasp the fringe of copyright.6 9
In conclusion, mention should be made of the statement of
Justice Sims, in Crump Co. v. Lindsay. 0 The plaintiff had ex-
pended considerable money and effort in the preparation of a
catalogue of automobile parts. The defendant saved himself
trouble and expense by photographing twenty or more pages of
this catalogue and used these in his own competing publication.
The plaintiff sought an injunction on grounds of unfair competi-
67. 189 Fed. 90 (C.C. Minn. 1911).
68. See J.H. White Mfg. Co. v. Shapiro, 227 Fed. 957 (D.C.S.D. N.Y. 1915)
(catalogue of brass trimmings for electric light fixtures); Campbell v. Wire-
back, 269 Fed. 372, 17 A.L.R. 743 (C.C.A. 4th, 1920) (illustrations of orthopedic
devices); Norris v. No-Leak-O Piston Ring Co., 271 Fed. 536 (D.C. Md'. 1921)
(catalogue of sizes and other details of piston rings for motors). In the latter
case there are two kinds of injuries: unfair competition and copyright in-
fringement committed by two different kinds of persons.
69. See J.L. Mott Iron Works v. Clow, 82 Fed. 316 (C.C.A. 7th, 1897).
70. 130 Va. 144, 107 S.E. 679 (1921).
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tion, and relied on the Associated Press71 case. The petition was
dismissed. Justice Sims concurred in the result, saying that
"under our system of jurisprudence a court of equity will not
adjudicate an abstract question of whether a defendant possesses
a right of conduct."72 He also asserted that there was no evidence
of substantial injury. However, he disagreed with the reasoning
of the court and pointed out that the plaintiff, in complaining of
the defendant's copying, had not contended that he had a coyp-
right, but rather a right to enjoin the defendant from using the
method by which he produced his copy.
"The Crump Company [plaintiff] concedes that the Lindsay
Company [defendant] had a perfect right to produce the same
result which it did produce provided it had done so by some
method which was not rendered less expensive by photo-
graphic copy and use by it of portions of the Crump Company
catalogue. But the claim of the Crump Company is that, the
latter method, being an unauthorized appropriation and use
by the Lindsay Company of the result of the work and ex-
penditure of the Crump Company, the use by the Lindsay
Company of the result of such method constitutes unfair com-
petition in business, and therefore should be enjoined by a
court of equity. 73
It is believed that statements such as the above presage a
new period in the law of unfair competition in which the appro-
priation of literary and artistic qualities will give rise to rights
which will be protected by the courts on simple principles of
fairness and through an insistence that ideas of decency in com-
petition be observed. The present practice of resort to the law
of copyright is productive of unnecessary confusion, depends on
attenuated doctrines and offers at best a makeshift and fortuitous
approach.
71. 248 U.S. 215, 39 S.Ct. 68, 63 L.Ed. 211 (1918).
72. 130 Va. 144, 166,,07 S.E. 679, 686 (1921).
73. Ibid.
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